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Who Drives Diaspora Development? 
Replication of Mexico’s 3×1 Program in Yucatán
Aaron Malone




Migration and remittances are increasingly 
central to development plans and the search 
for best practices has driven convergence 
of diaspora development policies. Mexico 
is often considered a model, particularly 
its Tres Por Uno or 3×1 Program that offers 
matching grants to encourage migrant orga-
nizations to sponsor development projects 
in their origin communities. We employ a 
policy mobilities framework to ask how this 
program has been positioned as a model 
and exported from its original contexts. 
With replication in other high emigration 
countries possible, we examine internal repli-
cation within Mexico to evaluate the model’s 
possible external relevance. We focus on 
its re-grounding in Yucatán, a new sending 
state with low intensity and short history of 
migration by Mexican standards. Despite 
the non-traditional context, the state has 
rapidly embraced the migrant-centered 3×1 
Program. We find that the program initially 
followed expectations in Yucatán, but within 
a few years devolved into a pattern of “simu-
lation”/aval projects that are controlled by 
municipal officials and minimize migrant 
involvement. Without effective counter-pres-
sures from migrant organizations, corruption 
and clientelism became common. We con-
clude that implementation in a very distinct 
context mainstreamed and normalized prob-
lems that had been present but marginal in 
the original contexts.
Keywords: transnationalism, development, 
policy mobilities, Mexico
Resumen
La migración y las remesas son temas cada 
vez más centrales en planes de desarrollo que, 
en búsqueda de modelos exitosos, propician 
la convergencia de varias políticas de desarro-
llo que tratan el tema de la diáspora. México 
suele ser considerado como un modelo al res-
pecto debido a programas como el llamado 
Tres Por Uno o 3×1, el cual ofrece subsidios 
combinados a organizaciones de migrantes 
que adelantan proyectos de desarrollo en sus 
comunidades de origen. Empleando el marco 
analítico de políticas de movilidad, pregun-
tamos cómo este programa mexicano se ha 
posicionado como modelo y ha sido expor-
tado a otros contextos nacionales. Siendo 
posible su replicación en otros países de alta 
emigración, examinamos la replicación del 
3×1 dentro de México evaluando la posible 
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relevancia externa del modelo. Nuestro argu-
mento gira en torno a su rediseño en Yucatán, 
un nuevo estado emisor con baja intensi-
dad y corta historia de migración según los 
estándares mexicanos que ha adoptado rápi-
damente el programa 3×1. Encontramos que 
allí el programa inicialmente cumplió con 
las expectativas pero al cabo de unos pocos 
años generó patrones de “simulación”/aval 
controlados por funcionarios municipales 
con mínima participación de los migrantes. 
Ante la ausencia de participación efectiva 
de organizaciones de migrantes, la corrup-
ción y el clientelismo se volvieron comunes. 
Concluimos que su implementación en un 
entorno muy distinto al original amplificó 
y normalizó problemas que habían estado 
presentes pero marginales en los contextos 
iniciales del 3×1.
Palabras clave: transnacionalismo, 
desarrollo, movilidades de políticas públicas, 
México
Introduction
In recent decades, origin country govern-
ments have shown increased interest in 
migration as remittances become central to 
less developed nations’ economies (Bakker, 
2015). By the mid-1990s, remittances to 
developing countries surpassed official devel-
opment aid, and by 2015 remittances were 
triple the value of aid (World Bank, 2015). 
Even in Mexico, a country with more than a 
century of notable and sustained migration 
history, remittances have garnered increased 
attention in recent years as volumes grow 
and data improves. For the first time in 2015, 
remittances surpassed petroleum as Mexico’s 
leading source of foreign exchange, draw-
ing still greater attention to their economic 
centrality (Esteves, 2016). The value of remit-
tances continues to grow although migration 
from Mexico has slowed, demonstrating 
the durability of this transfer pattern and 
quashing any doubts about its continued 
importance, at least in the short to medium 
term (Orozco, 2017).
Increasingly, origin countries see remit-
tances as more than just an individual transfer 
of money from a migrant to his or her family, 
but rather as a development strategy for 
an entire nation. Governments attempt to 
leverage their diasporas as development 
resources by implementing policies to bolster 
transnational ties and encourage migrants’ 
contributions not only to their families but 
also to infrastructure and other community 
projects (Portes & Fernandez-Kelly, 2015). 
Mexico has formalized efforts to maintain 
the flow of remittances through its innovative 
Tres Por Uno, or 3×1 Program for Migrants. 
The program is a form of public-private part-
nership between the Mexican government 
and U.S.-based hometown associations 
(HTAs), which are clubs of migrants from 
a common origin that typically engage in 
philanthropy, mutual support, and cultural 
or recreational activities. The 3×1 Program 
incentivizes HTA contributions for com-
munity projects, referred to as collective 
remittances, by offering matching funds from 
federal, state, and municipal governments, 
creating a three-to-one match that gives 
the program its name. Common projects 
include building infrastructure such as roads, 
water, sewer, and electricity in migrants’ 
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hometowns, as well as educational, cultural, 
sports, and health projects.
The 3×1 Program is hailed as a policy 
model whose relevance is not limited to 
the contexts in which it emerged, but rather 
extends throughout Mexico and beyond. 
The remittance strategy is commonly cited 
in discussions of global diaspora or migra-
tion-linked development policy (e.g. Orozco, 
2013; McKenzie & Yang, 2015), various for-
eign governments have sent study teams to 
see the program in action, and its visibil-
ity has been boosted by involvement from 
international organizations, including the 
World Bank, USAID, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Iskander, 2010).
The first expansion of the model took it 
from its informal origins among migrants 
from the traditional migrant origin regions 
in central Mexico, to formalization as the 
3×1 Program, to expansion throughout the 
country. Replication in other countries with 
sizable numbers of migrants is possible, given 
the program’s visibility and positioning as 
a diaspora development best practice, yet 
few studies have examined how the program 
functions outside its original contexts. In 
this paper we analyze the positioning of the 
3×1 Program as a policy model by examining 
empirical evidence from its most significant 
replication to date — the internal replication 
created by institutionalizing it as a federal 
program throughout Mexico.
We examine the expansion of the model in 
Yucatán, one of the three states of the Yucatán 
Peninsula in southeastern Mexico. Yucatán 
has only recently been incorporated into the 
country’s migratory tradition as one of the 
“new sending areas” of Mexican migrants 
to the United States. For a new emigration 
area, Yucatán has been remarkably active 
in the migrant-driven 3×1 Program. Many 
new Yucatecan hometown associations have 
been formed and more than a hundred rural 
villages have benefitted from 3×1 projects. 
Yucatán’s total expenditures within the 3×1 
Program are eleventh highest of Mexico’s 
thirty-two states.
At first look, this rapid uptake of the 
migrant-led development program appears 
to be a success story. Upon closer exam-
ination, however, the growth — often in 
municipalities with very low migration 
intensity — raises questions about mutations 
of the model and outright corruption. We 
are left asking how well suited the 3×1 Pro-
gram is to replication and implementation in 
Yucatán. This paper examines 3×1 projects in 
Yucatán to understand how place and con-
text influence the application of the policy 
model. This kind of comparative analysis 
of implementation across multiple contexts 
yields deeper insights about the policy itself, 
which is of particular value in this case given 
its status as an international model, as well as 
allowing reflection on the process of policy 
mobilization.
We use a policy mobilities framework to 
explore the regrounding of the 3×1 Program 
in Yucatán, after first reviewing the program’s 
evolution in its original contexts in central 
Mexico. This framework structures our analy-
sis of whether and how replications duplicate 
the documented benefits of pioneering 
examples of the model, and when and why 
replications in new contexts yield substantial 
deviations or novel results.
Recent geographical research on policy 
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mobilities centers on the concepts of policy 
assemblages, mobilities, and mutations as 
a way to explore the movement of policies 
across space and place (e.g. Peck & The-
odore, 2010; McCann & Ward, 2011, 2012; 
Prince, 2012; Baker & Temenos, 2015). The 
policy mobilities framework examines how 
policies are assembled in specific places and 
draw on local resources and contexts, how 
they are mobilized and packaged, and how 
they are mutated in the process of movement 
and through application in new places. In 
a globalized context of substantial policy 
convergence, both in the urban realm that 
has dominated policy mobilities research 
and in migration and diaspora policy — an 
inherently international field — it is impera-
tive to understand how context shapes policy 
development and its subsequent replication 
in new places.
Literature Review
Migration and developMent nexus
Scholars have long debated whether migra-
tion is more likely to spur development in 
origin areas and countries, or perpetuate 
underdevelopment. Optimistic views have 
dominated in some eras and pessimis-
tic views in others (Faist, 2008; de Haas, 
2012; Gamlen, 2014a). Optimism has been 
resurgent since the late 1990s, amid grow-
ing recognition and better accounting of 
the huge sums of money remitted by inter-
national migrants. Scholars and officials 
increasingly see migrants as transnational 
actors who can contribute and participate, 
even from a distance (Levitt, 1998; Vertovec, 
2009). This has been accompanied by a dis-
cursive shift away from narratives of migrants 
as deserters and toward discourses of migrant 
heroes — loyal and generous contributors 
to the homeland (Durand, 2004). Origin 
country governments and international orga-
nizations have rushed to embrace migrant 
and diaspora populations and enact policies 
to facilitate and encourage remittances and 
investments, often converging on common 
ideas and policies (Delano, 2014; Bakker, 
2015; Price, 2017). A technocratic air pervades 
the current optimism about migration as a 
win-win process, with officials emphasizing 
policy solutions and arguing that “migra-
tion benefits everyone as long as the policies 
are right” (Gamlen, 2014b, p. 198, emphasis 
added). This perspective acknowledges that 
migration has not always benefitted origin 
areas, but assumes that best practices exist 
or can be developed to produce desired out-
comes. We argue that to the extent migration 
policy ignores context — both contexts from 
which policies emerge and contexts in which 
they are to be regrounded — these assump-
tions are problematic. A policy mobilities 
lens can help correct this problem.
Mexico has been at the center of diaspora 
development and migration policy trends, 
particularly its famed 3×1 Program (Orozco, 
2013; McKenzie & Yang, 2015). Mexico’s 
posture toward emigrants and diaspora 
has shifted seismically since the 1980s, and 
especially since the early 2000s, with several 
diaspora outreach programs unveiled and 
expatriates’ rights expanded (Delano, 2011). 
The changes have garnered attention from 
governments in Latin America and beyond 
that look to Mexico as a model for diaspora 
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policies (Delano, 2014). It is in this context 
of ascendant optimism and technocratic 
policy convergence that we examine Mexi-
co’s 3×1 Program, analyzing its mobilization 
and replication within Mexico and discussing 
its implications more broadly. This concrete 
case study helps us contextualize and make 
sense of the spread of diaspora development 
policies.
Migration froM Mexico and Yucatán
Emigration from Mexico has traditionally 
been dominated by individuals leaving rural 
communities in the historic heartland of 
west-central Mexico, particularly the states 
of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, and 
Zacatecas and neighboring areas, and going 
to principal destinations that include Cal-
ifornia, Texas, and Chicago (Massey et al., 
2003). Those patterns have diversified sig-
nificantly in recent decades to include many 
new origins and destinations (Zuñiga & Her-
nandez-Leon, 2005; Riosmena & Massey, 
2012), including more migrants from urban 
areas (Hernandez-Leon, 2008) and more 
indigenous migrants (Klooster, 2013). The 
southeastern region of Mexico is among 
the most recent to make a substantial con-
tribution to migration flows. This paper 
focuses on the southeastern state of Yucatán, 
where emigration has been limited and 
recent by Mexican standards, but nonethe-
less has made a noticeable impact and has 
increased rapidly since the 1990s (Cornelius 
et al., 2007). As a new region of international 
migration, the scholarly attention to migra-
tion from Yucatán is limited but growing 
(e.g. Adler, 2004; Burke, 2004; Cornelius et 
al., 2007; Piacenti, 2009, 2012; Solís Lizama 
& Fortuny, 2010; Iglesias, 2011).
Migration is part of broader patterns of 
change in Yucatán that have been driven by the 
long-term decline of the traditional agricul-
tural economy in the state’s rural areas (Carte 
et al., 2010; Iglesias, 2011). One result has been 
large-scale rural-to-urban migration to the 
capital city of Mérida and to the emerging 
tourist hub of Cancún in neighboring Quin-
tana Roo (Cornelius et al., 2007). Eventually 
a secondary trend emerged of international 
migration from Yucatán to the United States. 
Cornelius et al. (2007) note that Cancún often 
serves as a sort of “migration school” where 
rural and indigenous people gain experiences 
and skills that make the option of migration 
to the USA more visible and viable. The short 
history of migration from Yucatán means 
fewer people are able to draw on family or 
other networks to obtain legal status in the 
USA; a state official told us that an estimated 
90 percent of Yucatecans currently in the 
USA are undocumented. He estimated that 
about 70 percent live in California, princi-
pally the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, 
with smaller clusters in Portland, Dallas, and 
Denver (personal communication, January 
25, 2016). Official data show that emigration 
from Yucatán predominantly comes from 
a southern cluster around Oxkutzcab and a 
northern cluster around Cenotillo; meanwhile, 
87 percent of the state’s municipalities are rated 
as having very low international migration 
intensity, as is the state as a whole (Zamora 
Ramos & Gonzalez, 2014).¹
the 3×1 prograM
The 3×1 Program traces its roots to infor-
mal, localized community projects that 
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migrants from Mexico’s historic migration 
region have been undertaking since at least 
the 1970s. Piecemeal government support 
dates from the 1980s, coalescing in 1992 with 
formalization of the precursor 2x1 matching 
program in Zacatecas, and expansion nation-
wide in 2002 with the institutionalization of 
the federal 3×1 Program (Fernandez et al., 
2006; Garcia Zamora, 2007; Iskander, 2010). 
Annual investments through the 3×1 Program, 
including collective remittance contributions 
by HTAs and the triple government match, 
grew from an initial total of Mex$400 million 
in 2002 to Mex$1.5 billion in 2014, the latest 
year for which full records were available.²
Research on the program has docu-
mented improvements in infrastructure 
and provision of public goods in beneficiary 
communities (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004; 
Duquette-Rury, 2014), and diversification of 
public investment away from municipal seats 
and toward rural areas (Burgess, 2005; Fox & 
Bada, 2008). Authors have also emphasized 
that migrants’ financial stake can enable them 
to check the power of traditional elites and 
pressure government actors for transpar-
ency and efficient use of program resources 
(Bakker, 2007; Garcia Zamora, 2007) — a 
point we will discuss in more detail later. 
Evaluations have not been entirely posi-
tive, however, as studies also have revealed 
patterns of partisan manipulation to direct 
matching funds toward party strongholds or 
to align project timing with election cycles 
(Meseguer & Aparicio, 2012; Waddell, 2015; 
Simpser et al., 2015).
The literature on the 3×1 Program, 
briefly summarized in the previous para-
graph, includes overviews and quantitative 
analyses at the national scale, but qualitative 
and case study research has been limited to 
the experiences of pioneering migrant orga-
nizations and examples from states in the 
historic migration heartland (e.g. Fernandez 
et al., 2006; Garcia Zamora, 2007; Iskander, 
2010; Bada, 2014).³ The limited engagement 
with nontraditional contexts obscures the 
diversifying range of experiences within the 
3×1 Program. The program has been widely 
adopted in the fifteen years since it was insti-
tutionalized nationwide, with more than half 
(54 percent) of all municipalities in Mexico 
completing at least one project and all but 
two states participating. The portion of the 
program budget absorbed by the four lead-
ing states (Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, 
and Zacatecas) decreased from 70 percent 
over the first five years to 40 percent by 
2014.⁴ A survey of Mexican HTAs found that 
three-quarters had been founded since 2002, 
the year the 3×1 Program was established, 
and that many new clubs form at the invi-
tation of municipal presidents specifically 
to participate in the program (Duquette-
Rury & Bada, 2013; also see Goldring, 2004). 
Research on the 3×1 Program needs to be 
expanded beyond the pioneering cases to 
capture more experiences. This paper con-
tributes to the task by focusing on the new 
emigration region of Yucatán.
Despite being latecomers to international 
migration, Yucatecan communities have 
engaged extensively with the 3×1 Program. 
The first projects in the state were completed 
in 2004, the program’s third year, with just five 
of the state’s one hundred six municipalities 
participating. By 2014, eighty-seven munici-
palities (82 percent) had participated in 3×1, 
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completing an average of five projects each 
over ten years. Yucatán’s total 3×1 Program 
expenditures of Mex$390 million since the 
federal program began rank eleventh highest 
out of thirty-two states — a remarkable statis-
tic for a state that consistently ranks among 
the lowest in migration intensity. Yucatán’s 
higher migration municipalities are the most 
active in the program, but the majority of the 
participating municipalities are classified as 
low or very low migration intensity. This mix 
of nontraditional characteristics and strong 
program participation bolsters our position 
that research on 3×1 must extend beyond 
the pioneering examples from the high-mi-
gration heartland region. Our goal in this 
paper is to analyze how this federal program 
to support and encourage diaspora contribu-
tions has been adapted in the distinct context 
of Yucatán. Examining replications of 3×1 
in new contexts allows us to examine the 
policy’s positioning as a model, analyze the 
importance of context for replications, and 
discuss implications for the general ideas of 
diaspora development.
policY Mobilities approach
Our analysis of the replication of the 3×1 
Program outside of its original contexts is 
grounded in the emerging policy mobilities 
theoretical framework. This framework takes 
a critical approach to policy, focusing on 
questions of power to understand how poli-
cies emerge and spread, the effects they have, 
and the ways people and groups interact with 
policy (Shore et al., 2011; McCann & Ward, 
2012). A key starting point is the problema-
tization of the idea of best practices. Success 
and failure are not objectively determined, 
but instead are shaped by the ideological and 
methodological orientations of networks of 
experts with the power to designate success 
and failure (Prince, 2012; McCann & Ward, 
2015). Peck & Theodore (2015) emphasize 
the interplay of evaluation and marketing 
in the technocratic positioning of policies 
as best practices with salience beyond their 
place of origin. The packaging and marketing 
of policies renders them as myths — decon-
textualized and functionally polyvalent, able 
to interface with and legitimize varied prac-
tices and existing ideas, rather than specify 
or dictate a uniform program (Lieto, 2015). 
Reflecting on the development industry, 
Mosse (2005, p.14) comes to a similar con-
clusion, that “policy primarily functions…to 
legitimize rather than to orientate practice.”
A second focus of policy mobilities 
research is the importance of place and con-
text, both for assessing the extent to which 
policies reflect the contexts from which they 
emerge and for analyzing the regrounding 
of mobilized policies in diverse contexts. 
Policies are assembled in places, absorbing 
local influences together with more diffuse 
elements, but mobilization is often partial, 
with only some parts of the model moving 
(McCann & Ward, 2015). Again, power is 
central both in the mobilization of policy and 
in its uneven reproduction in new contexts. 
These insights become particularly important 
as policymaking is increasingly globalized 
and decisions reflect influences and expertise 
from diverse contexts.
We apply the policy mobilities approach 
first by examining the importance of context 
in the emergence of the 3×1 Program and 
the creation of a legitimizing policy myth, 
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and then by examining how the model is 
regrounded in distinctive new contexts. 
We recognize that because policy is pack-
aged and mobilized through abstractions 
and incomplete histories and because it is 
regrounded and renegotiated in each place, 
we must consider the agency of a multiplicity 
of actors and the substantial scope for varia-
tion and repurposing beyond what might be 
envisioned by the policy entrepreneurs and 
institutions that do much of the mobilizing. 
This is particularly true in the case of the 3×1 
Program, which mandates the participation 
of migrant organizations and all three levels 
of Mexican government. We study “up, down, 
and sideways” (Stryker & Gonzalez, 2014) 
to understand the complex power dynamics 
at play.
This study also contributes a new per-
spective within policy mobilities research. 
The majority of work using this approach 
focuses on interurban or translocal mobili-
ties linking cities around the world. The key 
players in these accounts are urban officials 
and the traveling policy experts, consultants, 
and organizations with whom they interact 
(Temenos & McCann, 2013). The focus is 
urban and global, with national governments 
rarely factoring into these analyses (Lovell, 
2017). Our case study includes migrant and 
municipal policy entrepreneurs who more or 
less fit the typical city-centric mold, but the 
example also shows that the Mexican federal 
government has played a key mobilizing role. 
The federal government’s early engagement 
helped solidify the fledgling program in the 
original contexts and shaped its institution-
alization, which made the policy mobile 
and introduced it in numerous new contexts 
around Mexico. Other studies of policy 
mobilities in Latin America similarly note 
the importance of national governments 
(Delano, 2014; Jajamovich, 2016).
Research Methodology
This research relies on interviews and field 
observations in the state of Yucatán, Mexico, 
as well as analysis of national-scale adminis-
trative data from the 3×1 Program. The first 
author conducted four weeks of field research 
in Yucatán in early 2016, as well as in-person 
and telephone interviews with USA-based 
Yucatecan migrants.⁵ The research presented 
here is part of his larger research project exam-
ining collective remittances and hometown 
associations throughout Mexico, encom-
passing interviews and fieldwork in eight 
Mexican states and with associated migrant 
organizations across the USA, as well as 
interviews with World Bank and Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank officials who have 
worked on the topic. The second author 
conducted survey research in Yucatán over 
two months in 2008–2009 and conducted 
interviews and field observations in 2012 and 
2015. Each author conducted semi-structured 
interviews with federal, state, and munic-
ipal officials as well as leaders of migrant 
hometown associations from Yucatán. Our 
analyses of 3×1 Program trends in Yucatán 
and beyond are based on administrative 
data for all projects completed nationwide 
from 2002 to 2014, obtained from Mexico’s 
National Transparency Institute (INAI) at 
www.infomex.org.mx.
The research specifically looked at seven 
Yucatán communities with completed 3×1 
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projects. The study includes municipalities 
ranging from very low to high international 
migration intensity, as calculated by Mexico’s 
population bureau, all of which have medium 
or high levels of marginalization (Zamora 
Ramos & Gonzalez, 2014).⁶ The municipali-
ties range in population from 1,000 to 30,000.
Framing the 3×1 Program
From its earliest iterations, the 3×1 Program 
and its informal precursors have been cel-
ebrated as groundbreaking examples of 
migrant initiative and diaspora-led devel-
opment. The air of perceived success was 
solidified in part by a positive evaluation 
commissioned by USAID (Orozco, 2003) 
and by support from the World Bank 
and Inter-American Development Bank 
(Iskander, 2010). It also helped that the model 
could be framed as a version of public-private 
partnership, in line with dominant neoliberal 
thinking at these international institutions 
and within Mexico’s federal bureaucracy.
The standard discourse of the pro-
gram emphasizes that it is a grassroots 
Figure 1. Migration Intensity Index for Municipalities in Yucatán, 2010. Source: Map by author, data 
from CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de Población).
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phenomenon; that migrants began organiz-
ing and completing projects on their own 
and the government only got involved later. 
This stylized origin story is epitomized by 
frequent reference to the “0×1” era, when 
migrants’ collective remittances were not 
matched or supported by government 
involvement. At that time, migrant orga-
nizations were completing public projects 
to address unmet needs without any help 
from the government. The cero por uno era is 
indeed foundational for the 3×1 Program, and 
it is true that government involvement came 
as a response to the initial stimulus provided 
by migrant groups. Yet the constant invoca-
tion of this grassroots origin story by both 
migrants and government officials empha-
sizes only some elements of the program’s 
origins, and has the potential to distract from 
the important ways it has since evolved.
In contrast to the grassroots discourse, 
academic analyses have produced more 
nuanced interpretations that complicate the 
narrative. Some of the most consequential 
analyses to date of Mexican HTAs converge 
on the conclusion that interactions with var-
ious levels of government have long played a 
fundamental role in strengthening migrant 
organizations and influencing the evolution 
of the collective remittance phenomenon 
(Goldring, 2002; Iskander, 2010; Bada, 2014). 
These authors convincingly argue that the 
evolution, growth, and solidification of the 
extensive network of Mexican HTAs, and 
the evolution of the associated 3×1 matching 
program, would not have happened without 
early engagement between migrant groups 
and government actors that provided sup-
port and recognition to the fledgling groups.
The conclusions these authors draw stand 
in sharp contrast to the myth-making that 
centers grassroots as the defining characteris-
tic of the 3×1 model. Rather than grassroots 
migrants going it alone, Iskander (2010) doc-
uments a history of evolving and iterative 
cooperation, coordination, and occasional 
conflict between migrant organizations and 
government actors in the pioneering Zacate-
can example. She uses the term “interpretive 
engagement” to describe the dense web of 
interactions and relationships that she iden-
tifies as the most important factor in the 
evolution of a strong and functional program 
in Zacatecas — the basis for the creation of 
a federal program. She points to the inter-
pretive engagement itself as the true best 
practice to be emulated. Bada (2014) studied 
Michoacano HTAs and emphasizes similar 
relational processes as a key element. In both 
cases, translocally successful approaches were 
established not because grassroots migrant 
organizations went it alone, but because they 
participated in a productive learning process 
together with government and community 
actors. The types of engagement identified 
as fundamental to early successes were not 
necessarily replicated, however, as the insti-
tutionalization of the 3×1 Program packaged 
and exported a mechanical formula or policy 
model to be implemented with or without 
substantial engagement and cooperation 
(Iskander, 2015). We will return to this point 
in our discussion of the Yucatecan case.
Our purpose in critically analyzing the 
discourse of grassroots origins is not to min-
imize or discount the truly impressive efforts 
of migrants and migrant organizations, but 
rather to assess how the policy was assembled 
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and mobilized, identify gaps in the origin 
myth, and consider the importance of the 
original context. The long history of emigra-
tion from the historic heartland region, its 
extensive networks of migrants abroad, and 
a particular focus on local ties all contributed 
to a strong pattern of hometown association 
formation (Portes et al., 2007). “The migrant” 
became a figure associated with development 
and progress; migrants and migrant organiza-
tions were accorded status and legitimacy as 
social and political actors (Smith & Bakker, 
2008; Iskander, 2010). Migrants and migrant 
organizations have gained a higher profile in 
Zacatecas than perhaps any other state, befit-
ting the area’s migration history. In Zacatecas, 
half of all municipalities are classified as very 
high or high migration intensity (Zamora 
Ramos & Gonzalez, 2014). In Guanajuato 
the figure is 39 percent and in Michoacan 
it’s 35 percent (in Yucatán just 2 percent are 
high or very high migration intensity). The 
emergence of the 3×1 Program was heavily 
influenced by this historic heartland context 
and was intertwined with the rise to promi-
nence of migrants and migrant organizations.
The pioneering examples from the his-
toric heartland region are important not only 
as the contexts in which the 3×1 Program 
emerged, but also as the cases that serve as 
points of reference and legitimization for 
the model. Migrants from a few pioneering 
states engage in lighthearted debates about 
who should get credit for instigating the 
first precursor projects that led to the cre-
ation of 3×1, but in most accounts Zacatecan 
migrant groups have become the face of 
the program — the pioneering “brand” of 
collective remittances (see the discussion of 
policy brands in Temenos & McCann, 2013). 
Even within Mexico, Zacatecas stands out as 
a high migration area and has become inex-
tricably linked to the 3×1 Program and ideas 
of migrant-led development. The pioneering 
Zacatecan case is fundamental to the brand-
ing and mythologizing of the program, both 
as a success and as a grassroots, migrant-led 
model. In interviews, federal officials and 
officials in other states nearly always refer-
enced the Zacatecan case in positioning and 
justifying the program’s replication in new 
contexts. Zacatecas takes on the status of a 
brand, standing in for the pioneering expe-
riences across the historic migration region 
that were central in the model’s emergence.
As noted earlier, the empirical focus of this 
paper will be on the replication of the 3×1 
Program in the nontraditional origin state of 
Yucatán. The state presents a starkly different 
context from the historic migration region, 
yet institutionalization of the program at the 
national level allowed the model to be repli-
cated and regrounded there. We document 
the results of the 3×1 Program in Yucatán and 
compare them to the pioneering examples, 
using a policy mobilities framework.
Regrounding the 3×1 
Program in Yucatán
hurricane isidore and the beginnings of 
3×1 in Yucatán
The first hometown associations representing 
Yucatán organized in response to Hurricane 
Isidore, which struck the peninsula in 2002, 
causing extensive damage. Interviewed by 
phone in September 2016, the leader of the 
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first Yucatecan HTA to join the 3×1 Pro-
gram noted that after the hurricane, many 
people wanted to do something to help. 
There had been a growing number of people 
from the same hometown living in the Los 
Angeles area, but they were not in regular 
contact. Responding to the hurricane was 
the first time they were motivated to organize. 
They coalesced as a group and raised funds 
through raffles and small events, and donated 
it directly to needy, hurricane-affected fami-
lies in their Yucatecan hometown.
The process of organizing relief donations 
brought the group into contact with other 
Yucatecan migrants and laid the foundation 
for further organizing. They also began to 
establish links with existing Mexican migrant 
groups in the Los Angeles area, including 
Zacatecan and Michoacano hometown asso-
ciations, which introduced them to the 3×1 
Program that had just been formalized and 
expanded nationwide that year. Upon learn-
ing of the matching grant program, the young 
Yucatecan groups reoriented their efforts to 
work within the program. The club leader 
recounted:
There had not been any [3×1] projects 
yet in Yucatán. . . . I explained [to the 
group] that the program could be a big 
benefit for Yucatecan communities. If 
we put in a dollar, the others [three 
levels of government] put in the same. 
To get the program going, I talked to 
my group and we did the first project, 
rehabilitating a kindergarten (personal 
communication, September 21, 2016).
A handful of hometown associations 
representing Yucatecan communities 
organized, researched the 3×1 Program, estab-
lished contact with officials back home, and 
began submitting projects. The first projects 
were approved during the 2004 funding cycle, 
with Mex$1.1 million in migrant contribu-
tions and Mex$4.4 million total expenditure 
in Yucatán for the kindergarten, a senior 
center, residential water service, church ren-
ovations, and two ambulances. The program 
caught on quickly in Yucatán, expanding to 
eighteen projects with Mex$2.2 million in 
migrant contributions in 2005, and twen-
ty-three projects with Mex$4.5 million in 
migrant contributions in 2006.⁷ Migrant 
leaders and government officials uniformly 
reported in interviews that 3×1 projects in 
Yucatán during these early years were ini-
tiated and funded by the nascent migrant 
organizations, with government officials 
playing a supporting role.
The direction of early Yucatecan home-
town associations was shaped by the 
nontraditional origin context of Yucatán, as 
migrants were organizing for the first time 
and working to forge new connections with 
one another and with their origin commu-
nity governments. Yucatán’s low migration 
intensity meant they had smaller commu-
nities of hometown emigres from which to 
draw. The shorter history and lower intensity 
of migration also meant that migrants did 
not have the same status and visibility in the 
origin communities as do their counterparts 
from the historic migration region. These 
differences are important as we analyze the 
replication of the 3×1 program in this new 
context.
However, in addition to the nontraditional 
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origin context, the Yucatecan HTAs were 
also influenced by the traditional destina-
tion of Los Angeles and the mentoring of 
established HTAs. A Yucatecan migrant 
leader we interviewed said the Zacatecan 
organizations in California were like big 
brothers who passed along their knowledge 
to the fledgling groups. Migrant leaders and 
officials from Zacatecas put on a 3×1 Pro-
gram workshop for new HTAs from other 
states and took them on a tour of projects 
in Zacatecas. Zacatecan HTA leaders also 
visited Yucatán to help jump-start the pro-
gram there. These influences fit the classic 
policy mobilities model, as the program’s 
innovators promoted the model to prospec-
tive emulators and led study tours to show 
successful examples.
The early experiences in Yucatán mirror 
the pioneering model and the grassroots 
discourse of the program to a remarkable 
degree, despite notable differences in con-
text. Summarizing, migrants living in the 
U.S. began organizing independently, then 
found out about the 3×1 Program and 
rechanneled their activity through it. Gov-
ernment actors were involved from an early 
stage, but their initial roles can reasonably 
be characterized as reactive and supportive 
rather than driving the initiative. The policy 
model that had been packaged and mobi-
lized was regrounded in Yucatán with little 
if any mutation. Early examples followed 
both the letter of the policy and the spirit 
of the model.
recession, Mutation, and “siMulation” 
projects
The earliest applications of the 3×1 Program 
in Yucatán closely approximated the pio-
neering examples, but within a few years 
the story diverged from this auspicious start. 
The grassroots variety of 3×1 in Yucatán was 
supplanted by so-called simulation projects, 
representing a significant mutation of the 
model — as might be expected, given the 
substantial differences in context relative 
to the policy’s origins. Simulation projects, 
most commonly referred to as aval proj-
ects in Spanish,⁸ are initiated and funded by 
municipal governments, with migrant groups 
providing only their signature on the project 
paperwork. The project is a simulation in the 
sense that HTA money and engagement exist 
only on paper, while in reality the munic-
ipal government manages everything and 
covers the migrant share of the cost. Given 
the three-for-one matching structure, even 
contributing its own share plus the intended 
migrant organization share in a simulation 
project, a municipal government can double 
its money by capturing the state and federal 
matching funds.
The economic recession of 2008 was an 
important catalyst for the shift from slow 
growth driven by migrant initiative to a pat-
tern of simulation projects with minimal 
migrant involvement. Migrants’ incomes and 
financial security in the USA were battered 
by the recession; household remittances, 
which often remain steady during recessions, 
dropped in Yucatán by 20 percent from 2008 
to 2009.⁹ Yucatecan HTAs were no longer 
able to fund projects in the same ways or 
to the same extent that they had before 
the recession. Paradoxically, the decreased 
availability of migrant contributions opened 
the floodgates as municipalities shifted to 
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simulation projects. The modest fundraising 
capacity of the handful of new Yucatecan 
HTAs had been the limiting factor for pro-
gram growth, but with simulation projects 
that was no longer the case. Municipal gov-
ernments could submit as many projects as 
they could fund, covering their own desig-
nated contribution and the intended migrant 
part, as long as a migrant organization would 
sign off on the paperwork. Mayors and even 
entrepreneurial migrant “leaders” began 
recruiting migrants to register new HTAs 
specifically to enable simulation projects, in 
some cases creating ghost clubs that exist 
only on paper (Burgess, 2016).¹⁰
Simulation projects quickly became 
the default approach in Yucatán. Speaking 
frankly, migrant leaders and government 
officials alike conceded that nearly all Yucate-
can 3×1 projects in recent years have been 
simulations (Gomez Hernandez, 2014 also 
noted this trend). One interviewee in Cali-
fornia quipped that they would be surprised 
if Yucatecan migrant groups put in even 1 
percent of the 3×1 Program funds attributed 
to them (personal communication, April 30, 
2016).
Three trends in the program’s administra-
tive data would be counter-intuitive during 
a recession but make sense as evidence of a 
shift to simulation projects, helping corrob-
orate interviewees’ claims. First, as seen in 
Figure 2, supposed migrant contributions to 
the 3×1 Program in Yucatán ballooned from 
Mex$4.5 million in 2006 to a peak of Mex$23 
million in 2009, despite the recession — recall 
that household remittances decreased during 
this time. Second, the number of partici-
pating municipalities and HTAs increased 
rapidly during the depths of the recession. In 
addition, for the first time in 2009, individual 
clubs began sponsoring projects in multiple 
Figure 2. Trends 
in 3×1 Program 
Activity in Yucatán 
State, 2004 to 
2010. Data source: 
Instituto Nacional 
de Transparencia, 
Acceso a la 
Información y 
Protección de Datos 
Personales (INAI).
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municipalities and working with municipali-
ties other than their own — a notable anomaly 
in a program premised on migrants working 
to benefit their communities of origin. The 
shift to simulation projects allowed the 3×1 
Program to scale up in Yucatán — 82 percent 
of municipalities have benefited from at least 
one project — despite the economic reces-
sion and despite the context of relatively 
limited and recent emigration.
Simulation projects are not unique to 
Yucatán, but the prevalence of the pattern 
is noteworthy. Simulations have been iden-
tified in numerous contexts, including in 
pioneering areas and dating back to the early 
years of the official program (e.g. Valenzu-
ela, 2006; Villela, 2014; Burgess, 2016). The 
key distinction is that in most contexts sim-
ulation projects account for a fraction of 
program activity and are often vigorously 
challenged by established migrant organiza-
tions. Our conclusion is that Yucatán’s nearly 
complete reliance on simulation projects is 
not a difference of kind but rather of degree. 
The program mutated over time in Yucatán 
to mainstream and normalize a practice that 
existed in the original contexts but was mar-
ginal and contested.
We argue that the 2008 recession was 
a decisive moment and the response to it 
crystallized the simulation mutation. The 
recession was the first major obstacle in 
Yucatán’s replication of the 3×1 Program. In 
the pioneering cases, Iskander (2010) and 
others highlighted how migrants and officials 
worked through problems and breakdowns 
along the way — including debates about 
what constitutes a legitimate migrant orga-
nization, about how much the state should 
influence project selection, and about how to 
deal with failed projects — through interpre-
tive engagement and ongoing cooperation and 
collaboration. In contrast, in Yucatán, the 
first major roadblock derailed engagement 
rather than deepening it. Shifting to simu-
lation projects might have been intended 
as a stopgap measure to keep the program 
afloat as HTA donations dried up during 
the recession, but in the long run the change 
seems to have demonstrated to key govern-
ment actors in Yucatán that the program 
could run without HTA contributions or 
substantial migrant involvement. Instead 
of migrants and officials working through 
the setback iteratively and collaboratively, 
the existence of a fully formed policy with 
a dedicated funding stream opened the 
door for officials to manage the program as 
they would any other and step away from 
the difficulty and limitations of partnering 
with migrant organizations. The migrant 
groups, meanwhile, did not have the orga-
nizational strength nor the political clout 
to challenge this shift — even the oldest of 
Yucatecan HTAs had existed just five years 
when the recession began. Thus, the prac-
tices of interpretive engagement failed to 
materialize and government officials were 
centered while migrants were relegated to 
the margins. Despite initially appearing to be 
a close replica of the pioneering model, the 
3×1 Program in Yucatán was diverted at this 
key juncture and went to scale as a simulation 
model. We argue that this mutation toward 
simulation projects opened the door for 
customary practices of clientelism and cor-
ruption to gain a foothold in the 3×1 Program, 
outlined in the following section, contrary to 
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expectations of increased transparency and 
pressure for good governance.
Why did the policy mutate so significantly 
in Yucatán, despite the early parallels in orga-
nizing and migrant initiative? Context is a 
central factor. The policy model emerged in 
the distinctive context of the migration heart-
land, with its sustained history of intensive 
migration and extensive migrant organizing, 
and the outcomes the policy boosters have 
encouraged everyone to expect are derived 
from that unique example. The contextual 
factors in Yucatán are very different. The 
state has emerged as a new emigration area, 
but the intensity of migration remains very 
low relative to other parts of Mexico. The 
short history also means migration networks 
are less established, which contributes to 
the high incidence of undocumented status 
among Yucatecan migrants, in turn fostering 
a culture of secrecy around migration. These 
factors help account for the much lower 
profile and limited power of migrants and 
migrant organizations in Yucatán. In contrast 
to Zacatecas and the pioneering contexts 
where HTAs have become powerful actors 
who work to advance their own agendas, in 
Yucatán’s less-than-extreme migration con-
text, the lower visibility and power of migrant 
groups left them unable to resist coopting of 
the model.¹¹
grassroots deMocracY to elite 
corruption
The Yucatán case presents a cautionary 
tale that good governance effects often 
associated with the 3×1 Program and trans-
national migrant organizing cannot be taken 
for granted. Previous research has been 
optimistic about the transformative power 
of migrant organizing, engaged transnational 
citizens, and collective remittances (e.g. Bur-
gess, 2005; Moctezuma, 2011). Hometown 
associations are seen as venues for political 
and civil action that cultivate transnational 
solidarity by engaging community mem-
bers as well as local, state, and national 
governments to address community needs 
and, ideally, herald a new period of political 
transparency and responsiveness (Orozco & 
Lapointe, 2004; Garcia Zamora, 2007; Smyth, 
2017). The 3×1 Program is assumed to nurture 
and support these trends, despite being a 
government program, because it is portrayed 
as independent and grassroots.
Discussions linking migrant-led develop-
ment to good governance and transparency 
agendas begin from an assumption, either 
explicit or implicit, that the baseline is a 
state of bad governance. In Mexico broadly, 
there is a long and pernicious history of 
clientelism (Fox, 1994; Seffer, 2015) and 
corruption (Morris, 1999; Warf & Stew-
art, 2016). The country’s much discussed 
democratic transition has not eradicated 
these patterns; as some types of corruption 
and clientelism diminish, new forms have 
emerged (Seffer, 2015). Even within Mexico, 
the state of Yucatán stands out for its per-
vasive and entrenched systems of political 
and economic control that have remained 
largely unchecked since the colonial and 
hacienda eras (Goodman, 1974). Goodman 
(1974, p.150) remarked on the ubiquitous 
corruption, noting that “everyone in the state, 
from the highest government officials, to the 
richest merchants, to the lowest peasants, is 
fully aware of this.”
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Although migrant organizations have 
been discussed as a countervailing force with 
the potential to upend historic patterns of 
corruption and elite power, we have not 
always found that to be the case in Yucatán. 
The examples in the following paragraphs 
highlight problems that emerged from the 
regrounding of the 3×1 Program in this par-
ticular context, and that also reflect on the 
program’s structure. In sharp contrast to the 
association between diaspora development 
and good governance, these examples illus-
trate how the 3×1 Program can become a 
medium for new corruption to flourish or old 
corruption to evolve.
As discussed earlier, the transition to sim-
ulation projects that cut out the participation 
and leadership of migrants underscores the 
(de)evolution of the 3×1 Program policy. 
Within the Yucatecan case, the migrant as 
the true motor and origin of the hometown 
association has become a myth. For example, 
discussing a Portland, Oregon, organization 
that is considered one of the most success-
ful Yucatecan HTAs, a Yucatán state official 
admitted that it was the municipal president 
who initiated the formation of the HTA. The 
migrants who comprise the organization had 
to be convinced by state and local officials to 
go along with the arrangement. The official 
related:
We asked them to see it as an opportu-
nity to help improve their community. 
We also told them that if we did not 
do it [form an HTA and participate in 
3×1] in their community, we would do 
it in some other municipality anyway 
because it was a resource the federal 
government had given and we had to 
make use of it. That is how we got this 
group involved (personal communica-
tion, December 11, 2012).
The state official’s comment highlights an 
unintended consequence of institutionaliz-
ing the 3×1 Program: Officials began to see 
it as money that would be left on the table 
if they did not find a way to claim it. This 
perspective reinforced the growth of sim-
ulation projects, and, as noted in the quote, 
was often convincing to migrants. Even if 
they could not follow the intended model of 
the program by initiating and funding their 
own projects, migrants could help out their 
hometowns by going along with municipal 
governments’ schemes to qualify for the 
funds.
Beyond simulation projects and ghost 
organizations, signs of corruption and clien-
telism are clear in the 3×1 Program in Yucatán. 
Migrant leaders allege that government offi-
cials now routinely collude with contractors 
to receive kickbacks. One complained, “I love 
this program but it makes me sick and gives 
me a headache because I have to deal with 
these crooks,” later adding, “At this point they 
could rename the program instead of ‘Pro-
gram 3×1 for Migrants’ to ‘Program 3×1 for 
Contractors and Government Employees’” 
(personal communication, April 25, 2016). 
Project budgets are inflated and materials 
and workmanship are shortchanged to maxi-
mize profits and graft, often at the expense of 
project quality. Unfortunately, in Yucatán the 
allegations of corruption extend beyond the 
usual suspects. One migrant leader accused 
other migrants of “learning” from the way 
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government officials take advantage of the 
program and beginning to demand pay-
ments from mayors in exchange for signing 
off for simulation projects — effectively using 
the HTAs they control to sell access to the 
program.
The story of a hometown association 
project in one of our research communities 
illustrates the role political and economic cor-
ruption plays. The impetus for the creation 
of this hometown association came from 
a member of the community’s economic 
elite in Mexico. He personally flew to the 
USA to meet with emigrants from his town 
and educated them on the matching funds 
available via the 3×1 Program. After officially 
establishing an HTA and deciding together 
with the migrants that a much-needed health 
clinic would be the first project, he used his 
political influence to make sure his wife was 
hired as the designing architect and her fam-
ily’s construction business got the contract 
to supply materials and manage construction. 
Community members routinely commented 
on the profit these local elites made by ensur-
ing the projects were channeled through their 
own family businesses and their self-interest 
in facilitating the formation of a hometown 
association.
It is worthwhile to question whether the 
transnational economic and political activ-
ities by migrants actually promote change. 
Are migrants involved in altering the status 
quo of the political order, finding new forms 
of visibility and participation as transmi-
grants that they had not achieved prior to 
migration? While HTAs can be seen as 
agents of change that usurp the power of 
elites and long ingrained political machines, 
the partnership of the state and federal gov-
ernments with migrants could also be seen 
as perpetuating the status quo (Itzigsohn, 
2000). Although many examples exist of 
hometown associations catalyzing positive 
changes in their communities of origin, our 
experiences in Yucatán demonstrate that 
is not always the case. We found that the 
presence of simulation projects and the for-
mation of ghost HTAs specifically to facilitate 
simulations often went hand in hand with 
corruption and clientelism in the execution 
of projects. In these examples, a program 
designed to empower diasporas and support 
their engagement was captured by local offi-
cials and existing elites to pursue their own 
interests, rather than challenging the status 
quo or promoting good governance.
Conclusion
The pioneering examples of the 3×1 Program 
from Zacatecas and the historic heartland 
region are used to brand the policy model 
and legitimize its expansion. However, as we 
have shown, replication of the program in 
new contexts will not always recreate those 
perceived successes. The model assumes 
strong and respected migrant organizations 
that are treated as full partners alongside gov-
ernment actors — an assumption based on 
the context in which the program emerged. 
In Yucatán, however, we found that the 
expectations the program makes of migrant 
groups were too much for the state’s fledg-
ling HTAs. Lacking the ability to operate as 
equals with government actors, the migrant 
organizations were displaced from any mean-
ingful role.
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The peripheral issue of simulation projects 
became a mainstream and normalized prac-
tice in Yucatán as municipal officials became 
the true drivers of activity. They learned to 
manage the program like any other, in some 
cases leading to corruption and graft of proj-
ect funds. This is an example of a policy being 
mutated through its application in a new 
context — a common outcome of mobiliza-
tion. It is not inevitable that mutations will be 
negative, but it is nearly certain that a policy 
will function differently as it is regrounded in 
new contexts with different power structures. 
In this case, the most significant mutation 
was not the introduction of a new element, 
but rather an amplification of a preexisting, 
but previously marginal, problem.
One interpretation of this example is that 
the policy model has significant weaknesses, 
but that they did not become fully mani-
fest in the pioneering cases because of the 
uncommon strength, dedication, capacity, 
and political clout of the pioneering migrant 
organizations. Once the model was applied 
in new contexts where migrants had not 
attained such power, the policy’s faults 
emerged more clearly. This implies that it 
is not the 3×1 Program model itself that was 
successful in the pioneering areas, but rather 
that strong migrant organizations (and their 
government counterparts) succeeded, with 
the program being a conduit for their activity. 
This mirrors Iskander’s (2010) conclusion 
that the pattern of interpretive engagement is 
the best practice to be emulated, not the 3×1 
Program’s specific mechanics. This conclu-
sion should serve as a cautionary example for 
other governments considering replicating 
the 3×1 Program: Not that it is fundamentally 
flawed and cannot succeed, but rather that 
it is not a foolproof model, impervious to 
context.
As this example of the expansion of the 
3×1 Program within Mexico demonstrates, 
strong and capable migrant organizations are 
essential to the policy’s proper functioning. 
We join other researchers in critiquing the 
Mexican federal government for focusing on 
expansion of the 3×1 Program and formation 
of new HTAs with little concern for the 
groups’ strength or capacity to participate 
(Escala et al., 2011; Escala, 2014). Although 
we recognize that there are significant limita-
tions and potential drawbacks to government 
efforts to strengthen HTAs, more could be 
done to facilitate and support migrants’ own 
efforts at organizing. Escala et al. (2011, p. 
66) conclude that “simply creating more 
organizations and asking them to take on 
more activities will probably not translate 
into better or more projects.” Our research 
confirms these fears, finding that the 3×1 
Program spurred the formation of numer-
ous Yucatecan hometown associations, but 
because these HTAs lacked capacity or insti-
tutional strength, they were quickly pushed 
aside by municipal officials and marginalized 
from their own program.
Notes
¹The migration index, calculated by Mexico’s 
population bureau (CONAPO), includes 
data on remittances, emigration, circular 
migration, and return migration.
²The exchange rate for Mexican pesos to U.S. 
dollars was approximately Mex$10 to US$1 
from 2002 to 2008. From 2009 to 2014 it 
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fluctuated around Mex$14 to US$1.
³Exceptions include studies in Hidalgo and 
Oaxaca (Fernández et al., 2006), Yucatán 
(Gomez Hernandez, 2014), and an unidenti-
fied “central” state (Smyth, 2017).
⁴Authors’ calculations, based on administra-
tive data obtained from Mexico’s National 
Transparency Institute (INAI) at www.info-
mex.org.mx.
⁵The first author received funding for this 
research from the University of Colorado’s 
Geography Department, Center to Advance 
Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences, 
and from the Tinker Foundation via Colo-
rado’s Latin American Studies Center. The 
second author received funding from the 
Fulbright Hays Faculty Research Award as 
well as Bucknell University.
⁶The marginalization index includes data 
on education, housing quality, rurality, and 
income.
⁷The migrant share of a project budget is 
generally one-fourth of the total expendi-
ture, due to the 3×1 matching structure, but 
in Yucatán the state government declined 
to contribute or only contributed to a few 
projects in 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014, creating 
a functional 2x1 match. Migrant share data 
are presented instead of total expenditure to 
allow easy comparison between years with 
3×1 and 2x1 matching structures and to avoid 
confusion.
⁸From the verb avalar, meaning to endorse 
or cosign, proyectos de aval are ones in which 
an HTA signs the necessary documents to 
submit a project but does not contribute 
funds. The 3×1 Program head at Sedesol men-
tioned in an interview that his central office 
staff refers to the projects as simulaciones, and 
we adopted the term because of its better 
translation to English (personal communi-
cation, April 22, 2016).
⁹Remittance data from Banco de Mexico, 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet.
¹⁰Only HTAs registered with the Mexican 
government or authorized by an existing 
HTA federation may sponsor 3×1 projects. 
A club must be made up of at least ten adult 
members living outside of Mexico.
¹¹We make this comment with some ambiv-
alence, as even within the community of 
Yucatecan migrant organizations, frustration 
with the simulation model and resistance 
against it is not uniform, with some individ-
uals taking a more opportunistic approach, as 
we discuss later.
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